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REMAINING SILENT:
A RIGHT WITH CONSEQUENCES
JEFFREY D. WALTUCK"

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is a country in which individuals are
innocent until proven guilty.1 In the immediate wake of the events
of September 11, 2001,2 people were eager to cooperate with
3
officials of law enforcement agencies. Much has come to light
since the earliest days following the aftermath regarding what
4
With this
appears to be the railroading of innocent people.
" J.D. Candidate, May 2005. The author wishes to thank his wife,
without whose love, understanding, and support this endeavor would not have
been possible. He further wishes to thank his parents, whose life-long
commitment to hard work made possible the enriched lives of their children,
and who instilled the value of education. Finally, the author wishes to thank
his brother for a life-time of unwavering friendship. The author dedicates this
Comment to his son.
1. See generally Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 616 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating in an appendix to his decision, "an accused
is presumed innocent until proven guilty"); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S.
740, 745 n.5 (1948) (stating that a person "is presumed innocent... until he is
proven guilty").
2. See The Day that Changed America, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001, at 40
(chronicling the events of September 11th, 2001). On this date, terrorists
hijacked four airliners, two Boeing 757s and two Boeing 767s, one of each from
United Airlines and American Airlines. Id. Two of the planes were flown into
the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, New York. Id.
Both towers later collapsed causing the second largest loss of American lives
in a single day since the Civil War, and the deadliest attack on American soil
ever. Id.
3. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 206 (2002) (discussing public acceptance of
police intrusion on privacy interests following September 11th). Nadler wrote:
It is undoubtedly true that after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, citizens feel a greater need to rely on police for safety and security.
As a result, citizens.., now may be more willing to give police wider
latitude to intrude upon individual privacy interests to further the
purposes of rooting out terrorism and enhancing our safety.
Id.
4. See Kevin R. Johnson, Symposium: Beyond Belonging: Challenging the
Boundaries of Nationality, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 864 (2003) (asserting that
immigrant minority groups may tend, under some circumstances, to be less
cooperative with law enforcement due to their questionable immigration
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backdrop of fear, and backlash against law enforcement, it would
seem logical and prudent not to answer questions of law
enforcement authorities and to request the assistance of counsel. 5
The Constitution, after all, grants these rights. 6 While exercising
these rights might well lead police to an assumption of guilt, or at
a minimum that something is amiss or being hidden, one can rest
easy knowing that this evidence of guilt will not make it in front of
a jury. 7 Right? Wrong! An individual's silence can indeed be used
against him as circumstantial evidence of guilt.8
This Comment analyzes the mosaic of law that has spawn
from Miranda v. Arizona.9 This Part illustrates the current
conflict among jurisdictions. Part II discusses the narrow holdings
of the Supreme Court and limited protections afforded by the
Constitution for suspects who remain silent and later become
defendants.10
It further discusses any assurances that may
otherwise be implicitly guaranteed to a suspect. 1 It distinguishes
between the time when such rights and protections become vested
in a suspect. Finally it will lay forth the extent to which evidence
of silence, if admissible, may be used, and how.' 2 Part III analyzes
the current state of the law. It also examines how it is being
status).
5. See Maria Sileno DeLoughry, Custodial Interrogations, 80 GEO. L.J.
1074, 1078 n.569 (1992) (discussing when "custody" begins and the right to
counsel arises).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Id. "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. Contra Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (holding that
evidence of silence may be introduced to impeach a criminal defendant if he
testifies at trial).
8. See id. (concluding that under some circumstances evidence of a
defendant's silence is admissible at trial).
9. 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966).
[W]e will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of
his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been
adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any
warnings have been given... [nor] can a knowing and intelligent waiver
of these rights be assumed on a silent record.
Id.
10. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238 (concluding that a defendant who chooses
to take the stand may be impeached with evidence of silence occurring prior to
being given his Mirandawarnings). See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619
(1976) (holding only that once given a Miranda warning, the suspect's silence
cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal trial).
11. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239 (offering that although evidence of prearrest silence is not constitutionally protected, some bars to admissibility may
lie on state evidentiary grounds).
12. See generally Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 101, 159
(2001) (pointing out the two ways silence evidence may be used, as
impeachment of a defendant's testimony and in the state's case-in-chief).
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shaped by rules of evidence, and not by the Federal Constitution,
and the reasons the courts have stated for doing so. Part V
suggests that a constitutional standard is unnecessary, its reasons
and rationale that the current restrictions adequately protect the
defendant and the integrity of the trial process, and why Jenkins
v. Anderson13 was rightly decided.
II. BACKGROUND
Besides Roe v. Wade,14 it is hard to imagine a Supreme Court
decision that has touched the popular culture to the extent
Miranda v. Arizona 15 has. Having heard of Miranda, most
Americans would probably say that they know that a criminal
suspect has to be informed of certain rights when being questioned
by police. 16 Two of which are the right to remain silent, and the
right to an attorney. 17 In fact these rights may be too well
known.18 For even though the Supreme Court has said that once a
suspect has been informed of his Mirandarights his silence cannot
be used against him at trial, the decision does not actually
19
In fact,
mandate that the rights be given to a suspect at all.
of
suspect
a
inform
to
not
incentives
have
police and prosecutors
20
of
trial
at
use
the
prohibits
only
Miranda
these rights.
21
warnings.
proper
without
obtained
information

13. 447 U.S. at 238.
14. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). In this famous decision the Court held that
the state could not place an absolute bar against a woman who chose to have
an abortion. Id.
15. 384 U.S. at 498-99. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 109, 110 (1998) (arguing that "Miranda v. Arizona may be
the United States Supreme Court's best-known decision").
16. See United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.l (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that, "[m]ost ten year old children who are permitted to stay up late
enough to watch police shows on television can probably recite [the Miranda
warnings] as well as any police officer").
17. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444-45.
18. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 116-17 (critiquing the decision in Fletcher
v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam)). The defendant's post-arrest, but
pre-Miranda,silence could not have been educed by police, when in fact the
defendant had been twice previously arrested and presumably had been read
his rights on at least one of those occasions. Id. This raised the specter that
his silence was a result of his exercising a known right and not as evidence of
a guilty conscience as the Supreme Court apparently concluded. Id.
19. Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2003).
"Is there actually a right to silence if peace officers can use harassing and
abusive tactics against suspects so long as the resulting statements are not
used in a subsequent criminal trial?" Id.
20. Id. The police don't fear any monetary sanctions for failing to issue
Miranda warnings. Id. The fact is that the police, in certain circumstances,
stand nothing to lose and everything to gain by intentionally failing to inform
a suspect of his Mirandarights. Id.
21. Id. "[A] violation of the privilege against self-incrimination 'occurs only
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Miranda unequivocally requires that for a suspect's
statement to be used at trial, he must have been informed of his
rights. 22 Ten years passed before the Supreme Court would
further clarify the application of its holding in Miranda. In 1976,
the Supreme Court held the use of a suspect's silence at trial was
fundamentally unfair. 23 A clear picture had seemingly emerged
regarding a suspect's rights granted under the Constitution in the
Fifth and Sixth amendments, and his right to enjoy those
privileges under the Fourteenth Amendment. 24
The holding of the Supreme Court seemed clear enough in
regards to the constitutional right of defendants. 25 In 1981, in
Jenkins, the Sixth Circuit applied Doyle when it reversed the
holding of the lower court on the basis that the prosecution
introduced evidence of the defendant's pre-trial silence. 26 The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit and
clarified its opinion in Doyle.27 The Court opined that the
fundamental unfairness that existed in Doyle was not present in
the case at bar. 28 The difference being that in Doyle the suspect
had been informed of his Miranda rights by authorities, and in
Jenkins the suspect had not. 29 The Court reasoned that what was
so unfair in Doyle was that the suspect had been told that he could
remain silent, and that the warning came with implicit assurances
that his silence would not be used against him either. 30 The
defendant's silence in Jenkins was not, the Court reasoned,
induced by any information provided by law enforcement, and
therefore not subject to the protections in Doyle. 31 In short, the
at trial."' Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264
(1990)).
22. 384 U.S. at 498-99. A prerequisite to using any statements made by the
defendant at trial is that he must be informed that he does not need to talk to
police. Id. This is a threshold issue of admissibility. Id. at 476.
23. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619. "We hold that the use.., of petitioners' silence,
at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
24. See David J. Skalka, Post-Miranda Silence: Defining Silence Under
Doyle v. Ohio, Has the Nebraska Supreme Court Become an Impregnable
Citadel of Technicality? State v. Woods, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 171, 185-86
(1996) (explaining the breadth and limits of Doyle).
25. Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1981). "[W]e conclude
that impeachment of a defendant with post-arrest silence is forbidden by the
Constitution, regardless of whether Miranda warnings are given." Id.
26. Id. However, the conviction was upheld since the Court found the error
of the lower court to be harmless. Id. at 1132-33.
27. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-06 (1982) (per curiam).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 605-07.
30. Id. at 604-05.
31. Id. at 603. The Court took note of the fact that the decision in Jenkins,
447 U.S. at 231, was based on when the silence occurred. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at
606. Flether reasoned that since the silence occurred prior to being arrested
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Court concluded that silence after a Miranda warning may be the
result of an invitation to remain silent once the accused is aware
the right is available to him. 32 This conclusion presupposes that a
suspect has no independent knowledge of his constitutional rights
aside .from what he is told at that time by law enforcement
33
officials.
A.

When Is a Suspect's Silence Protected?

A clear picture had now emerged as to what a criminal
suspect's rights were, and when those rights became vested. 34 A
temporal line of demarcation can thus be drawn at the point in
which a person has been read his Miranda rights. 35 A clear state
of the law properly concludes that from that point forward, any
silence shall not be used by prosecutors at trial. 36 The Supreme
Court further has held that prior to that point in time evidence of
37
silence is not constitutionally protected.
That would seem then, to be the end of the story; evidence of
silence is admissible at trial if the silence occurred prior to
receiving notice of enumerated rights under Miranda.3s There are,
however, two key clarifications that need to be made to that
assertion. First, the Supreme Court only said that use of silence is
not protected under the Federal Constitution, leaving open the
question as to whether it may be protected under any of the
constitutions of the fifty states.39 Secondly, it is the admissibility
and taken into custody, it must necessarily be based on something other than
what amounts to be a governmental invitation to remain silent. Id.
32. Id. at 607. 'In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances
embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due
process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence
when a defendant chooses to take the stand." Id.
33. Aaron R. Pettit, Should the Prosecution Be Allowed to Comment on a
Defendant's Pre-Arrest Silence in Its Case-in-Chief?, 29 LOY U. CHI. L.J. 181,
217 (1997). 'Most Americans can recite the Miranda warnings by heart from
having heard them repeatedly on television." Id.
34. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18 (holding a suspect's silence after having
been read his rights may not be used at trial).
35. Strauss, supra note 12, at 116. "[The Supreme Court [notes that]
reading Miranda warnings is the dispositive factor in determining
fundamental fairness." Id. (analyzing Fletcher).
36. See, e.g., Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (providing a
succinct explanation that "Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of
silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances.").
37. Klein, supra note 19, at 1337. In emphasizing that Supreme Court
decisions have provided for further protections and limits on the use of silence
through evidentiary and state constitutional grounds, the author states that
"[t]hrough a series of cases in the 1970s and 80s, the Court
'deconstitutionalized' Miranda." Id.
38. Fletcher,455 U.S. at 607.
39. See id. (holding that fundamental fairness is required by the U.S.
Constitution through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of the evidence of silence that is in question, and therefore must be
40
examined by each jurisdiction's rules of evidence.
Regarding the jurisdictional rules of evidence, at least
federally, the question has been answered. 41 Not surprisingly, by
the same Court that held no constitutional protection, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held there to be no protection under the
42
Federal Rules of Evidence.
For the states though, the waters are a bit muddier, for
another temporal line must be drawn. That line is drawn at the
time of arrest. 43 Thus, a distinction is made as to silence proffered
in a custodial setting versus non-custodial silence. 44
The
distinction is the increased possibility of duress and coercion that
45
exist to a greater degree for a person in police custody.
The Court left open the question of admissibility on state constitutional
grounds. Id. It was unclear that where a suspect remained silent, in the
absence of his Mirandawarnings, that it would ever be a violation of his rights
to use his silence as evidence in a cross-examination to impeach the defendant
if he chooses to take the stand. Id.
40. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239. While holding that the prosecution did not
violate the Constitution by introducing evidence of the defendant's silence at
trial, the Court explicitly stated that they were not in all cases allowing in
such evidence. Id. Other situations and jurisdictions may restrict the use of
such evidence. Id. The Court stated, "[e]ach jurisdiction may formulate its
own rules of evidence." Id. See also Fletcher,455 U.S. at 607 (stating that "[a]
State is entitled, in such situations, to [evaluate the admissibility] under its
own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence
may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant's own testimony").
41. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606. It can be inferred that since this is a federal
case and since the evidence was ultimately considered admissible, that
evidence of silence did not violate any federal rule of evidence. Id. This
position is consistent with the fact that the court mentioned evidentiary
considerations and chose not to find that admission of this evidence violated
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
42. Id.
43. Pettit, supra note 33, at 199. In addition to state jurisdictional
decisions regarding the admissibility of pre-arrest silence evidence, the
circuits are split as well. Id. Prosecutors have tried to put evidence of prearrest silence before juries in several circuit courts. Id. The Supreme Court
has not, as of yet, dealt with the issue, and the treatment in the circuit courts
has been varied. Id. Some courts have allowed in the evidence, while others
have not. Id.
44. Compare McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) (finding that the
"environment of police custodial interrogation" only required the issuance of
Miranda warnings as a prophylactic measure "after observing' that an
inherent coercion actually exerted its toll), with Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341, 346 (1976) (asserting that "it was the custodial nature of the
interrogation" itself that required the procedures set forth in Miranda be
followed).
45. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 471 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (referring to "the inherent coercion of the custodial interrogation");
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988) (implying that the level of
coercion increases with the time in custody when the Court stated, "the
presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged police custody");
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Given that Miranda warnings usually take place subsequent
to an arrest, an elementary timeline emerges. 46 The important
factors that determine the admissibility of silence in the
defendant's trial include: the time period prior to an arrest, the
time between an arrest and the issuance of Miranda warnings,
and the time subsequent to both the arrest and receipt of the
47
warnings.
B. How Can Unprotected Silence Be Used at Trial?
After first ascertaining when the suspect, now a defendant,
acted silently, 4s the relevant jurisdiction need now only apply its
constitution 49 and evidentiary rules to find the silence
admissible. 50 Key to that determination is the purpose for which
5
the prosecution seeks to offer evidence of such silence. '
There are two possible ways in which the state could use such
evidence at trial. 52 The first consists of its use during the state's
case-in-chief. 53 The other is by way of introducing it as evidence to
impeach the defendant himself.54 The rationale employed by the
courts in determining the appropriate use of the defendant's
silence seemingly differs as the courts struggle with not only the
Henderson v. Florida, 473 U.S. 916, 916 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting to a

denial of certiorari) (referencing the coercion as "the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings").

46. See, e.g., United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981)
(detailing a rare example where Miranda warnings were issued to a suspect

prior to arrest). The vast majority of situations where a suspect is informed of
his rights occur after he is arrested. Id. Caro stands as a rare example of a
suspect who was Mirandized prior to arrest. Id.
47. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 639 (1986) (imposing a
"bright-line standard" as to the conduct of police while interrogating a suspect
in custody, which directly carries over to the admissibility at trial of evidence
elicited on either side of this "bright-line").
48. Strauss, supra note 12, at 108. The rules regarding the admissibility of
silence as evidence in a defendant's trial hinge upon the key question of when
the silence actually occurred. Id.
49. Id. at 120. While the admissibility of silence as evidence in some
circumstances does not violate the U.S. Constitution in terms of its due
process requirements, several state courts have held that it does offend the
notions of due process of their state constitutions. Id.
In those states,
admissibility of silence is prohibited, not under an evidentiary approach, but
as a state constitutional due process question. Id.
50. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607. "A State is entitled... to [evaluate the
admissibility] under its own rules of evidence." Id.
51. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 120 (noting the difference between
evidence offered for impeachment purposes and evidence offered in the
prosecution's case-in-chief). The allowance of silence evidence in the case-inchief is more problematic since it cannot be espoused to be in rebuttal to any
potentially perjured testimony given by the defendant. Id.
52. Id. at 108, 112.
53. Id. at 112.
54. Id. at 108.
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purpose of the silence evidence, but alsoowhen that silence took
place. 55 The previously linear model of temporal delineations must
now be expanded to a planar field and include the purpose or
function that the silence will serve at trial. 56 This must be done
57
for each of the time frames denoted above.
After making such a functional determination, many
jurisdictions allow silence as evidence to be used unfettered
against a defendant who becomes a witness.55 The theory here is
that a defendant's silence may directly or indirectly contradict a
subsequent statement made under oath at trial.5 9 The truthfinding exercise is thus thwarted if a defendant is permitted to
offer testimony inconsistent with his prior actions and would
60
thereby not be accountable to a jury for such inconsistencies.
55. Compare State v. Kerchusky, 67 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on the admissibility of
silence evidence that occurred prior to arrest for use at trial in the
prosecution's case-in-chief), and State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (Idaho
1998) (holding that evidence of silence prior to arrest is inadmissible at trial in
the state's case-in-chief, citing Fifth Amendment considerations and opining
that the constitutional right always exists and does not wait for Miranda),
with United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(construing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, strictly, the court held that the only
impermissible use of silence evidence at trial was use that referenced the
defendant's post-Miranda actions). The court held that it was wholly
appropriate for the state to impeach the defendant on cross-examination with
silence occurring both prior to and subsequent to arrest but occurring before
the Mirandawarning. Id. at 1129-30.
56. See generally Strauss, supra note 12, at 108-40 (breaking down the
analysis of current law by first looking at the time in which the silence seeking
to be introduced as evidence took place, and then addressing how the courts
found admissibility based on whether the evidence was offered for
impeachment or as part of the state's case-in-chief).
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Butler, 924 F.2d at 1129-30 (holding that the decisions of the
Supreme Court only act to restrict the use of a defendant's statements or
silence as a consequence of being read his Miranda rights). The use of any
evidence of silence occurring prior to Miranda warnings is constitutionally
admissible for at least impeachment purposes. Id.
The Butler court
acknowledged that the Supreme Court left the door open as to its use in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Id.
59. See, e.g., id. at 1129 (holding that using silence evidence to impeach was
a means to prevent the defendant from offering perjured testimony). In
Butler, the defendant took the stand to explain why he had not previously told
his exculpatory story. Id. He explained that he did not have an opportunity to
inform police. Id. The court held that it was permissible to question the
defendant on cross-examination about opportunities that he had to talk with
police, but had remained silent. Id. The court said that not allowing such a
cross-examination would have the affect of allowing potentially perjured
testimony to go unchallenged. Id. The time frame for the silence introduced
by prosecutors was during the pre-Mirandaperiod. Id.
60. See Fencl v. Abrahamson, 841 F.2d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238).
It is firmly established that neither the fifth amendment nor the
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This use presupposes, however, that the silence occurred prior, at
least, to being warned of the defendant's Miranda rights.61 As
previously stated, any mention of a defendant's silence after
receiving such a warning has been held unconstitutional in federal
courts.62

While not universal, courts have dealt with the issue of the
use of a defendant's silence in the state's case-in-chief more
critically. 63 Using reasoning that is logically consistent, more
64
courts exclude evidence of silence in the state's case-in-chief.
6
5
Falling somewhere between the truth finding of a trial , the
prosecution's attempt to forestall a defendant's proffered perjury,
and the fundamental fairness required in Doyle, 66 it fits that on a

continuum of admissibility, evidence of a suspect's silence offered
in the state's case-in-chief should be more restricted than if it were
designed to impeach a defendant's testimony, 67 and more
admissible than if the possibility existed that such silence was
directly elicited by police by way of informing a suspect of his
Mirandarights. 68
fourteenth amendment is violated by the government's use of prearrest
silence to impeach a defendant's credibility when he testifies at trial.
When a defendant testifies at trial, the fifth amendment is not violated
because "impeachment follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside
his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the
criminal trial."
Id.
61. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619. Doyle clearly and unambiguously establishes
that once a suspect has been issued Miranda warnings, any silence after that
point is absolutely off-limits for prosecutors to raise at trial, be it for
impeachment, or for the state's case-in-chief. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that Fifth Amendment must be given a 'liberal construction");
United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Due Process prevents the admission of evidence of a defendant's
silence where no Mirandawarnings had been given if for purposes other than
the impeachment of the defendant).
64. See Moore, 965 P.2d at 180 (comparing the split of authority and citing
cases in support of its holding that evidence of silence should be excluded from
the state's case-in-chief whether occurring prior to or subsequent to a Miranda
warning).
65. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 80 (2000). The court in characterizing
the proceedings refers to the "truth-finding function of trials." Id.
66. 426 U.S. at 618.
67. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 120 (speculating that, "[a]dmission of
evidence of silence in the case-in-chief potentially poses a more difficult
question than impeachment"). "[I]mpeachment obviously occurs only after the
defendant takes the stand and arguably lies; the interest in preventing the
acceptance of perjured testimony may be sufficient to justify the introduction
of otherwise inadmissible evidence." Id.
68. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (opining that the use of post-Mirandasilence
at trial has limited value and can potentially be overly prejudicial, especially
in light of the fact that "every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous
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When grappling with the plethora of state and circuit
70
69
and more importantly have not,
jurisdictions that have,
addressed this issue, it becomes clear that the planar model ceases
to be sufficient. Conceptually speaking, a two-dimensional gridlike analysis must be expanded spatially to accommodate
jurisdictional differences. Only then does the mosaic that takes
shape accurately reflect the current state of the law.
III. ANALYSIS
In analyzing how silence may be used, it is important to both
identify and understand the competing interests. 71 It would be
overly simplistic to identify the State and the defendant, for they
are merely the parties. The interests are those of truth and facts
versus constitutional rights. 72 The Supreme Court has stated that
when constitutional rights are not violated the relevant question
becomes one of admissibility under the appropriate rules of
evidence. 73 In fact, there has never been a question as to whether

because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested").
69. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 137-38 (summarizing the lack of
uniformity in one area alone, that of pre-arrest and pre-Miranda silence, by
stating "courts in New Jersey, Maryland, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Texas"
have decided one way, while "[o]n the other hand, numerous state courts have
held" the other).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 854-56 (9th Cir.
1996) (declining to decide whether the prosecutor's reference at trial to the
defendant's silence, prior to arrest, was permissible). The court noted that the
defendant did not raise the issue at trial and it was therefore bound to review
under a clear error standard. Id. The court held that it could not make a
finding of clear error in the absence of a Supreme Court decision since the
circuits that have addressed the issue are currently split on the question. Id.
71. John W. Auchincloss II, Protecting Doyle Rights After Anderson v.
Charles: The Problem of PartialSilence, 69 VA. L. REV. 155, 165 (1983). There
are two competing interests for the court to weigh in a criminal matter. Id.
These are the defendant's due process rights and State's interest in getting
truthful testimony before the jury in its consideration of a conviction. Id. Cf.
Mark Berger, Of Policy, Politics, and Parliament:The Legislative Rewriting of
the British Right to Silence, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391, 429 (1995) (identifying the
competing interests in Great Britain). The criminal justice system needs to be
concerned with two primary considerations, which are of equal import. Id.
One of these considerations is prevention of abuse by the State. Id. The other
is the ability to use all available evidence against a defendant. Id. Cf. Alan
E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 314-15 (1998) (identifying competing interests in a civil
setting).
72. Auchincloss, supra note 71, at 165. The two interests or values must be
taken into consideration, not only by the court, but more generally if a
consistent rule of applicability is to be created. Id.
73. See Coleman v. State, 895 P.2d 653, 667-69 (Nev. 1995) (Steffen, C.J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court
cases on the admissibility of evidence of silence once a determination has been
made that its introduction is not constitutionally prohibited). Even evidence
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a person has a right to exercise what he believes, even correctly, to
be his constitutional rights. 74 The question is always one of
75
admissibility of that choice to the finder of fact.
This section analyzes the admissibility of evidence of such
silence, and when and under what circumstances it is admissible.
It addresses when constitutional concerns preclude admissibility,
when they do not, and the reasoning behind such determinations.
A.

The Function of a Trial

A criminal trial is reached for much the same reasons that a
civil trial is reached: the parties fail to reach an agreement. The
disagreement in the criminal trial is not what one might think
however, that the State and the defendant disagree as to whether
the defendant committed the crime for which he is accused. The
reason is rather that the parties disagree as to whether the State
can prove that the defendant committed the crime.
It shall be assumed for the sake of this Comment that there
are no disputes of law. This then leaves the trial as a forum to
dispute and resolve the disposition of facts. 76 What results is a
forum in which the admissibility of evidence is a key determinant
to the outcome.7 7 A criminal trial, of course, has the potential to
result in a loss of liberty for the accused. 78 One might conclude
that the primary focus of a trial is to bring out the truth.7 9 Given
the truth-finding function of a trial, why then should we exclude
any relevant, non-prejudicial evidence?
that burdens a defendant's Fifth Amendment right, without necessarily
violating it, may be admissible after the State's compelling interest is
considered. Id.
74. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 447 (1963) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating "[s]urely it is beyond the power of any
State to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. .. ").
75. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238 (demonstrating that there is indeed a
choice of litigation tactics, in that choosing to testify may effectually waive
Fifth Amendment protections, and illustrating how evidentiary matters
become the primary concern).
76. Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert out of the Picture, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1047, 1057 (2003).
77. Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Evidentiary Rulings Under Rules
403 and 404 Control Outcome of Discrimination Case, 24 No. 11 EMP.
A judge's decision on the admissibility of
PRACTICES UPDATE 3 (2001).
evidence is the key factor in the outcome of a trial. Id.
78. Gerard Quinn, Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 11 (1992).
Loss of liberty in a civil proceeding is highly unusual. Id. The risk of loss of
liberties is a characteristic difference between a civil and a criminal
proceeding. Id.
79. Glenn A. Fait, Victims' Rights Reform-Where Do We Go from Here?
More than a Modest Proposal,33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 705, 705-06 (2002). The
truth-finding function of a trial is, and should be, the purpose of a criminal
trial. Id.
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B. ConstitutionalProtections
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant, nonprejudicial evidence may be excluded if its admission would violate
the Constitution.80
It is well established in American
jurisprudence that a person cannot be compelled to testify against
8l
one's self.
1. HistoricalAnalysis
The reasons for this date back to pre-nineteenth century
England, where defendants were counseled, not by private
advocates, but by the court itself.8 2 The Framers, recognizing the
inherent coercion that potentially existed, afforded an accused in a
criminal matter the right not to testify against himself.83 Even
though the pre-trial phase of defendant's counsel by the courts has
changed, the underlying coercion implicit in the system remains a
84
problem.
85
Coercive interrogation is known for its lack of reliability.

80. FED. R. EVID. 402. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States .. " Id.
81. See Lisa Tartallo, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination: The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to
End Its Silence on the Rationale Behind the ContemporaryApplication of the
Privilege, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 137, 139-51 (1992) (chronicling the historic
rationale behind the privilege against self-incrimination from pre-colonial
England, through modern Supreme Court rulings).
82. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 321-23,
492-93 (MacMillian Pub'g Co. 2d ed. 1986) (1968) (giving the rationale behind
the state of the law, and giving examples from trials in the late seventeenth
century where the court counseled defendants).
Defendants were only
afforded counsel for murder prosecutions during this period of time, and not
for lesser offenses, such as theft, as they are today. Id. at 321-23.
83. See Berger, supra note 71, at 395-96 (contending that defendants under
the crown were coerced into confessions). This eventually led to the right not
to testify against one's self in England. See Levy, supra note 82, at 368-432
(describing the history of the Fifth Amendment in the United States). The
right against self-incrimination was well established in England prior to the
Revolutionary War. Id. By default, the colonies adopted English common law,
including the right against self-incrimination. Id. Not included in the original
drafting of the Constitution, the right against self-incrimination had been
adopted as common law in the States. Id. Even before the Bill of Rights was
ratified, many state constitutions contained provisions parallel to the right
that was forthcoming in the Constitution. Id.
84. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49. Coercion takes many forms. Id. It can
consist of both psychological and physical stress. Id. The fact remains that
much, if not all, of police questioning and interrogation occurs in privacy. Id.
85. See David Whedbee, The Faint Shadow of the Sixth Amendment:
Substantial Imbalance in Evidence-Gathering Capacity Abroad Under the
U.S.-P.R.C. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in CriminalMatters, 12 PAC.
RIM L. & POLY J. 561, 590 (2003) (concluding that the reliability of statements
that are coerced are suspect). Taken to its logical extreme, coercion can
become torture and is not a reliable means of ascertaining the truth. Sanford
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Thus, the protections provided by the Bill of Rights in regards to a
criminal defendant's right not to testify against himself can be
86
First, that protection of
attributed to two important ideals:
8 7
and interlocking
second,
individual liberties was paramount;
to forfeiture of
subject
with the first, that to make a defendant
must be of the
him
against
those liberties, the evidence presented
88
from the
elicited
Evidence
highest quality of reliability.
was
courts,
the
of
counsel
defendant himself, through the
89
Fifth
The
reliable.
not
inherently subject to coercion, and
Amendment stands as a protection of the individual against the
State, and serves as a safeguard of the truth-finding process of a
trial.90 Understanding the history behind the Fifth Amendment
and its continued importance, explains why a defendant might
choose to remain silent, but why then should that silence be
inadmissible?
2. Inadmissibilityof Silence
The reason evidence of silence is inadmissible corresponds
with the same reason as the historic need for the Fifth
91
If it could be argued that
Amendment itself, namely reliability.
the counsel of the court (an arm of the State) could affect the
representations of the defendant, thus making any resulting
admissions unreliable, 92 the same can be argued of any resulting
silence. 93 This is especially true when a suspect has been warned
Levinson, "Precommitment"and "Postcommitment" The Ban on Torture in the
Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2029 (2003).
86. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
87. Kyle J. Kaiser, Twenty-First Century Stocks and Pillory: Perp Walks as
Through
Pretrial Punishment, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1205, 1216-17 (2003).
Fourteenth Amendment due process, the Fifth Amendment protects a person's
fundamental right to liberty. Id.
88. Joseph L. Schwartz, Evidence-The Admissibility of Statistical
Probabilities in DNA Testing for Suspect Identification in Criminal
Proceedings-Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440
(1991), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 868, 873 (1991). DNA cases are an example,
but the underlying principle is the same, that dependability must be at the
heart of the determination as to the admissibility of any evidence upon which
a defendant may be at risk for losing his liberties. Id.
89. Berger, supra note 71, at 395-96. Ecclesiastical courts in seventeenth
century England often coerced confessions out of people. Id.
90. Auchincloss, supra note 71, at 165.
91. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49, (protecting truth in the
twentieth century by trying to eliminate coercion), with Levy, supra note 82,
at 321-23 (documenting examples of the coercive forces at play in England in
the seventeenth century).
92. Levy, supra note 82, at 321-23. When a suspect's only counsel is that of
the court, and the court necessarily is a function of the state, any admission by
the suspect becomes less reliable. Id.
93. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617. Once Mirandarights have been given, it cannot
be adequately determined if silence was a result of the warning or for some
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of his rights under Miranda.94 The Doyle Court said as much
when it held that the finder of fact could draw no reliable
inferences from a suspect's silence since it is entirely possible, if
not probable, that the silence was induced by the police when
informing a suspect of his right to remain silent. 95
The analysis of why silence may not be admissible is identical
to that of the historic need for the Fifth Amendment. The
reliability of the defendant's statements, or lack thereof, is the
determinant factor in the admissibility of evidence at trial. The
constitutional protections against the admissibility of a
defendant's statements, and the Doyle Court's protections of a
defendant's silence (after the issuance of Miranda warnings) serve
as the ultimate safeguards where the determination of the
veracity of such statements or silence would amount to rank
96
speculation.
C. Evidentiary Safeguards
Following the narrow holding in Doyle, Jenkins established
that for the silence to be excluded at a constitutional level, there
must be some inducement by the State to remain silent. 97 Absent
an explicit warning of the type required by Miranda, the Court
refused to find the defendant's silence had necessarily been
induced by the actions of the police. 98 Setting aside the fact that
such silence is protected under some state constitutions, 99 the
admissibility of silence rests on its analysis under the appropriate
rules of evidence. 100 Foregoing an analysis of the common law of
evidence and of each of the fifty states, the Federal Rules of
Evidence will serve as a modern analytical guide to the
other reason. Id. It would therefore be inherently unreliable to use such'
silence as evidence at trial. Id. Silence evidence becomes unreliable as a
result of state action. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. "Silence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings may be nothing more
than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest
silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise
the person arrested." Id.
96. Id.
97. 447 U.S. at 239-40. When a person, in a pre-arrest situation chooses
not to speak of his own volition, and not in response to an invitation to do so
proffered by police, evidence of his silence does not violate the Constitution.

Id.

98. Id. at 240-41. Once it had been determined that no constitutional issue
barred the admissibility of evidence of silence, it became a consideration of
relevancy under an evidentiary standard. Id.
99. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant
Federal Rules of Evidence).
100. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607. States are free to establish and use their own
rules of evidence for determining the admissibility of silence evidence when
the admissibility does not warrant constitutional protection. Id.
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admissibility of pre-Mirandasilence. 01'
Any analysis of the constitutional protections afforded
citizens must necessarily begin with the Constitution. To end the
discussion there, however, would be a mistake, for ample
10 2
protections lie outside the Constitution within enacted laws.
03
The right
Evidentiary rules provide one such example.
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framework
are set forth not only to protect the rights of those involved in any
individual trial, but to protect the evidentiary process for the
10 7
reliability of future trials, and to further other public policies.
From an individual rights perspective, however, this Comment is
only concerned with the results of the admissibility of evidence in
a particular trial against a particular named defendant.
Under this evidentiary analysis, the same principles that
08
The
applied to a constitutional analysis are in play here as well.'
to
easy
is
rule
the
and
white,
and
black
is
approach
constitutional
09
upon
based
exists
gray
of
pallet
full
a
that,
Beyond
apply.'
10
Constitutional principles
circumstances unique to each case.
101. See infra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
102. See, e.g., Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the protections afforded a defendant's silence by the Federal Rules
of Evidence in both the prosecution's case-in-chief and as impeachment
evidence).
103. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
104. See id.
105. Richard W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts, and the
Hard Look, 76 WASH. L. REV. 995, 1063 (2001).
106. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (creating admissibility for relevant
evidence); FED. R. EVID. 403 (creating a rule of evidence for the exclusion of
certain relevant evidence).
107. FED. R. EVID. 102. 'These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion
of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Id.
108. Compare FED. R. EVID. 102 (promoting truth via evidentiary
standards), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49 (protecting truth by eliminating
coercive influence by restricting admissibility at a constitutional level).
"We granted certiorari ... in order
109. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the
privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
But see David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and
follow." Id.
Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 962-63 (2001) (explaining that protecting
rights is better achieved under a catch-all approach like Miranda than trying
to employ a case-by-case scheme).
110. See Strauss, supra note 109, at 963 (discussing the merits of a black
letter standard versus a case-by-case basis for evaluating admissibility of
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should guide, even if the Constitution is not controlling."' This
does not necessarily demand the same result, just that the same
principles be applied.
Doyle was a state case decided on constitutional grounds. 112
But, had it been in federal court, perhaps the evidence of Doyle's
silence would not have been admitted under the Federal Rules of
Evidence,1 13 and the constitutional issue never would have been
reached," 4 the goal and the result being the same either way. The
goal of excluding prejudicial evidence, and the result being that it
would be excluded. 115
This illustrates that where evidence of silence is not protected
constitutionally as in Jenkins, 1 6 it is still afforded the just
consideration of its probative value versus its prejudice." 7 Once
evidence is admitted, the jury is free to draw whatever inferences
1 18
it chooses.
D. Relevancy of the Timeline
The timeline discussed in detail in Part II is still highly
relevant for two determinations. The first such determination is
that of probative versus prejudicial value and ultimate
determination of admissibility." 9 The second is that of the weight
of the evidence should it be admitted under the first step of the
determinative process.

admissions).
111. But cf. FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that where there were contradictory
constitutional considerations, those considerations would trump the
evidentiary rules).
112. 426 U.S. at 618. It would be a violation of due process to admit
evidence of silence after a person had been advised of the Mirandarights. Id.
113. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence that is more prejudicial than
probative); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (concluding that, "every post-arrest silence
is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the
person arrested").
114. Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). No
constitutional jurisprudential doctrine is more established than that
constitutional questions should not be decided unless it is unavoidable. Id.
115. See, e.g., G. Blair Mccune, Self-Incrimination Protection Under the
Alaska Constitution: A Descriptive Analysis, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 43, 57 (1995)
(chronicling decisions in Alaska that exclude evidence based upon both state
constitutional due process considerations and under Alaska's Rule 403 which
excludes overly prejudicial evidence).
116. 447 U.S. at 238-39.
"[U]se of prearrest silence to impeach...
credibility" is not a violation of constitutional protections. Id.
117. FED. R. EVID. 403. "[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id.
118. See Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 271, 279-80 (1987) (promoting the principle that evidence of a
defendant's silence should be admissible and that the system ought to trust
juries to make the appropriate determination as to the weight of the evidence).
119. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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By
Admitting the evidence is not the end of the line.
the
believes
he
admitting the evidence, the judge is saying that
jury can properly evaluate the weight of the evidence. In Fletcher,
the defendant, Weir, argued that his silence, though not explicitly
induced by a government warning, was made with knowledge of
120
Weir claimed that his
his rights gained through prior arrests.
silence should be excluded from admission because it was an
121
It was not excluded, but
exercise of his constitutional rights.
122
Weir was free to argue the
again, that is not the end of the line.
circumstances surrounding his silence and the jury is presumed to
be well equipped to evaluate the reasons for such silence and give
it due weight. Whether Weir wanted to admit his prior arrests is
of course another matter altogether, but courts are suited to advise
juries on what they can use to evaluate the defendant's guilt in the
matter before them. The court, foreseeing the defense argument
that the admission of the prior arrests to rebut the reason for the
silence would itself be prejudicial, could have, within its discretion,
excluded the evidence.
E.

Silence as a Right to Itself

Stated often is the supposition that one has the right to
silence, and that seems to be the end of the argument. Silence is
not a right unto itself; it is merely the outcropping of the right not
123
The Supreme Court
to testify as a witness against one's self.
a
defendant's failure
from
drawn
be
can
inference
no
that
said
has
to testify, for the Constitution prohibits the State from compelling
a defendant to testify. 124 Merely exercising a constitutional right
does not afford any guarantee that it will not be used against a
person. 125 An accused needs to weigh the value of that privilege to
him when choosing to exercise it.
IV. PROPOSAL
As described above, there is not currently a national standard
for determining the admissibility of silence that falls outside the
protection of Miranda. 26 Many courts have dealt with the issue,
120. 455 U.S. at 604.
121. Weir, 658 F.2d at 1129.
122. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
123. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. Only after a suspect has been informed of his
Miranda rights does use of his silence at trial rise to a constitutionally
protected right. Id.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Just because a
125. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973).
constitutional right may have negative implications in the criminal process,
the government is not precluded from using such tactics in the trial. Id.
126. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607. The Supreme Court explicitly left the
standard of admissibility of evidence of silence to the varied rules of state
court's rules of evidence. Id.
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but a national consensus has thus far eluded the Supreme
Court.127 Some have called for a consistent national constitutional
standard.128
While a consistent coherent rule based upon a
constitutional standard seems like a worthy goal, it is unnecessary
and unwise. As four cases involving Miranda rights come before
the Supreme Court this fall, 129 a call will surely be made to once
and for all set a constitutional standard to exclude all evidence of
silence by a defendant. 130 This section briefly looks at the cases
currently before the Supreme Court and the groundswell of
support for a single standard of constitutional protection. It also
proposes that the Court stand fast and execute the law in this area
as decided.
The Court has previously issued its rules piecemeal, 131 and
now may be the time to set forth a clear picture of the law and
answer what remaining questions there are as to constitutional
protections.
There is no need to make every protection of
constitutional proportion, and the Supreme Court needs to say
what the protections are, where they stop, and where evidentiary
32
safeguards begin. 1
The cases before the Supreme Court deal with additional
aspects of a suspect's Miranda rights. 133 These include the
127. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (illustrating a variety of
positions employed by several states).
128. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 162 (calling for a uniform national
standard of admissibility, presumably based upon a constitutional standard).
129. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub. nom.
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), remanded to Alvarado v.
Hickman, No. 00-56770, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 19497 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004);
Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2003), aff'd, 124 S. Ct 2601 (2004);
United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd and remanded
by 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004); United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721 (8th Cir.
2002), rev'd and remanded by 540 U.S. 519 (2004).
130. Since this Comment was first written, the Supreme Court has ruled on
these four cases. In both Yarborough, 541 U.S. 652, and Seibert, 124 S. Ct
2601, the Court limited its holding to affirmative statements and therefore did
not address the issue of silence. In Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, the Court
addressed the issue of the admissibility of physical evidence resulting from an
unwarned search, and again did not reach the issue of silence. And in Fellers,
540 U.S. 519, the Court remanded on Sixth Amendment grounds and did not
rule on any Fifth Amendment issues including silence.
131. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498-99 (holding a suspect must be warned of
his rights); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 (holding use of silence at trial of a suspect
who had been warned is unconstitutional); Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605-06 (ruling
admissible evidence of silence not reduced by a Mirandawarning).
132. But cf. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240 (holding that while silence may be used
to impeach, it failed to say whether all evidence of silence is permissible, or
only for impeachment purposes).
133. See, e.g., Fellers, 285 F.3d at 723 (considering whether an admission
prior to being given Miranda rights is admissible); Patane, 304 F.3d at 1014
(considering whether physical evidence obtained from information gathered
from a suspect without the benefit of Miranda rights is admissible).
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question of whether police may intentionally delay in advising a
suspect of his rights, and whether after such a delay information
34
gained can be used to gather evidence that will be admissible.
This is often called the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The question can present itself like this: A murder suspect is
questioned at the scene of a crime. There, police have a feeling
that the suspect is a bit reluctant to cooperate, and if they tell him
that he can remain silent, he might do just that. But the scene is
understandably emotional, and the officer feels that he can elicit
valuable information from the suspect. The suspect finally admits
to the crime and leads police to the murder weapon. It is clear
that the admission will not be admissible, but what about the gun?
This seems a bit far a field from the problem of silence, but
the court can and should use the same logic to afford the same
protection and set a consistent standard. Here the gun should
135
Why? The better question
most assuredly come into evidence.
is why not? There is no question that the defendant in this
hypothetical is the murderer, and that the weapon recovered is the
murder weapon, so why exclude it, merely because the state chose
not to avail itself of the opportunity to use the defendant's
statement at trial. An analog to this situation appears to be where
an unlawful search uncovers evidence that leads to evidence not
part of the illegal search. 136 It may appear to be an analog but the
two are distinguishable.
In the case of the illegal search, the first act is illegal, and
public policy must not encourage actions that violate the
Constitution. 137 In the case of the potentially un-warned suspect,
138
nor should it be. The
the failure to warn is not an illegal act,

134. Fellers, 285 F.3d at 723; Patane,304 F.3d at 1014.
135. See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630 (holding that the Fifth Amendment
protects one from being a witness against himself). Justice Thomas, writing
for the plurality, explains how the constitutional protection afforded a
defendant-witness is fully protected by excluding testimonial evidence. Id. at
2626. There is no such constitutional requirement that physical evidence be
excluded. Id.
136. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (holding that
not only is evidence that is directly obtained illegally without a search warrant
subject to exclusion, so too is evidence that is "found to be derivative" of the
illegal search).
137. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (reasoning
that indirect evidence should be inadmissible). If illegal searches resulted in
indirect evidence that was admissible, then police would actually be
encouraged to perform illegal searches. Id. This would create a promotion of
an unconstitutional policy, and is therefore bad public policy. Id.
138. But see Coleman, 895 P.2d at 663 (holding that by allowing post-arrest,
pre-Mirandasilence the court would encourage game playing). By prohibiting
the use of all silence subsequent to an arrest, the risk of police intentionally
refusing to issue Miranda warnings in the hopes of gaining useful information
is eliminated. Id.
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questioning comes with its own protections and consequences for
the state, that the statement1cannot be used at trial. 139 The poison
tree analogy only works if the location of the gun was obtained at
trial in violation of constitutional protections.
Just as with evidence of silence, evidence of the gun is subject
to the limitation of an evidentiary foundation.140 And as with
silence, these evidentiary safeguards are sufficient.141 The trial is
after all a search for the truth, and the evidentiary rules and
constitutional protections and limitations serve to ensure its
fairness.142
Constitutional rights live on a slippery slope.
A right
contracted may become useless and obsolete. So too, a right
expanded can be stretched to bear no resemblance to its origin.
The fear is that adhering only to the letter of the Constitution will
result in a practical denial of the right. 143 The fear is a real one
and decisions like Miranda4 4 and Doyle145 help to forestall the
circumvention of rights. The hope, however, is that the balance of
justice can be maintained within these rights and that the search
for truth is not derailed by unnecessarily expanding rights beyond
the scope of protections afforded by the Constitution.
If a man is standing between a police officer and another and
admits to a crime, the police officer may be barred from telling his
story,1 46 while the other may be free to tell his story to a jury. 47

139. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (holding a statement made without
the benefit of being informed of certain constitutional rights is inadmissible),
with Fellers, 285 F.3d at 723 (considering the admissibility of a statement
made prior to Miranda warnings, but repeated after being informed of such
warnings).
140. FED. R. EVID. 104. In this example, if the gun had been wiped clean
and there was no other evidence linking the gun to the crime, it might very
well be inadmissible; but if the fingerprints of the suspect were found on the
gun, and the rifling on the bullet matched the barrel of the gun, then it
probably would be found admissible. Id.
141. FED. R. EVID. 102. The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to
afford a fair proceeding in which the truth is revealed. Id.
142. Id.
143. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (expanding the constitutional
right against self-incrimination to include a warning by investigators).
144. Id.
145. 426 U.S. at 617-18.
146. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (holding that suspect must be
warned for the state to use his statement).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2)(a) (stating that an admission by a party
opponent is not hearsay).
This apparently contradictory rule actually
comports with Miranda, in that one of the principles for holding that nonadvised statements are not admissible is the inherent coercive effects of
private police interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-60. Presumably, the
presence of a third party, one without state affiliation, would also serve as an
adequate deterrent to coercion and thus support the truth of the statement.
Id.
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So too is there a dilemma in the law regarding silence. If a police
officer approaches two suspects at a crime scene and immediately
arrests one and begins to question both of them, and they both
remain silent, the silence of one may be admissible and the silence
of the other may not be. 148 These are questions of degree and not
49
of demarcation.1
The relevancy of such silence may be clear, so too may the
prejudice of the evidence. 150 The determination of such prejudice
lies with the trial court, 151 and not a hard and fast constitutional
Once the threshold question of
rule barring admissibility.
admissibility has been answered, the appropriate weight given it
is a job well suited for a jury with access to as near all the facts as
152
can be constitutionally admitted.
While it may not seem radical to espouse the status quo, in
53
it is
light of the fervent calls to expand a constitutional right,
the
right
is,
and
why
to
be
reminded
at
this
point
what
necessary
it should not be expanded. First, the Constitution provides for a
right against self-incrimination. 5 4 This literal reading has been
Next, it must be
wisely expanded enough to be practical.155
remembered that this right under the Constitution is in place to
Finally, the truth should come out.
promote the truth. 156
Expanding the constitutional right only aids to subvert the truth
and provide for mechanisms of suppression of evidence
unwarranted by a narrow protection not to give testimony at trial.
V.

CONCLUSION

A trial is search for the truth. Only through evidence is the
truth determined. The mechanisms of a trial and the rules of
evidence, tempered by the Constitution, serve the goal of finding
the truth. If a jury is to be the ultimate determiner of facts on its
way to the truth, it should have all the facts. Our rules of evidence

148. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the relevance of the specific point in
time in which a Miranda right or an arrest takes place). When silence occurs
is often the determinative factor in its admissibility. Id.
149. Contra id.
150. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 161 (calling "[s]ilence... inherently,
insolubly ambiguous").
Strauss
contends that jurors ascribe a
disproportionately large amount of weight to such silence. Id.
151. FED. R. EVID. 104.
152. FED. R. EVID. 104(e). The weight of evidence is a consideration of the
jury. Id.
153. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall.., be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."
155. See supra p. 668 (discussing the decisions that have expanded the

right).
156. See supra Part III.B.1. (discussing the reason behind the Fifth
Amendment is to promote reliability and truthfulness).
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are well suited to prevent prejudicial evidence from reaching a
jury, and juries are, in turn, well adept at weighing the evidence
on a case-by-case basis. To afford evidence of silence a blanket
constitutional protection deprives the trier of fact facts, always.
Our system is more subtle than that and able to evaluate each
instance independently.

